An EMP Mitigation Perspective: Systems and Components

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Nature of Electronic Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
Nature of EMP

EMP/E1 and E2 shock waves, ultra-fast overvoltage surges

Cannot couple with EHV Transmission lines

E3 pulse can couple with EHV Transmission lines

Similar phenomenon to Solar Storms
Nuclear EMP History

Soviet HEMP tests in the early 1960’s were reported to have damaged power equipment.

Russian military writings claim to have a super EMP weapon that can generate 200 kV/m*

Current Nuclear EMP

Various countries have optimized nuclear weapons for HEMP impact.

According to a recent published Pentagon assessment, NK is now capable of launching an EMP attack over the continental USA.
HEMP exposed regions for several heights. Red circles show the exposed regions for the given burst heights, for a nuclear burst over the central U.S. [Oak Ridge National Lab]
EMP History

No specific EMP full-scale testing has ever been carried out in the Free World

Possible broad utility system blackouts

Long-lasting grid devastation prediction from E1 debatable
EMP Mitigation Strategies

Prevention vs. Recovery
EMP Mitigation Attributes

Fundamentals

VS.

Electronic Sophistication
EMP Mitigation Attributes

Fundamentals

Power System Basic Components
Generators, Transformers, Breakers, T&D
Auxiliary Services, Pumps, Fans, DC, Fuels,
Prime Movers, etc.

Electronic Sophistication

Computer and Information Systems,
Automation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics
SCADA, EMS, DMS, PLC
The Early-Pulse Mitigation

Thousands of installations

Millions of components of very diverse nature, technology and vintage

A full preventative attempt to harden each item would consequently result in an overwhelming task
The E1 Early-Pulse Impact

Not direct impact to major power equipment

Insulation breakdown in electric/electronic circuitry

Large number of computer, microprocessors

Control centers SCADA/EMS/DMS/PLC

Distribution Lines and Transformers
The Early-Pulse Mitigation

Inherent built-in hardening takes place as compliant, new or refurbished, hardware constantly merges into the existing utility.

Full duplication of key Control Centers.

E1 or E2 shocks do not couple with EHV transmission lines and hence cannot damage major power equipment.
DOE Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan

The Joint Strategy identified five strategic goals:

1. Improve and Share Understanding of EMP: Threat, Effects, and Impacts
2. Identify Priority Infrastructure
3. Test and Promote Mitigation and Protection Approaches
4. Enhance Response and Recovery Capabilities to an EMP Attack
5. Share Best Practices Across Government and Industry, Nationally and Internationally
The Institutional Recognition

‘EMP and Geomagnetic Storm events have the potential to physically damage electrical and electronic equipment throughout North America’s critical infrastructure, notably including Extra-High Voltage transformers and industrial control systems like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems’*

*NERC Executive Brief ‘Electromagnetic Pulse & Geomagnetic Storm Events’
Research funded by PSERC, DOE, NSF, EPRI, BPA, the State of Illinois DCEO, and ARPA-E*, concludes that: “The two key concerns from a big storm or an HEMP are:

1) Large scale blackout due to voltage collapse, and
2) Permanent transformer damage due to overheating”.

*ARPA-E, stands for Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy
Need for GIC Mitigation

GIC currents, quasi-DC nature (up to 2 KA)

Saturate/overload the magnetic circuits of major power transformer and shunt reactors

Ample spectrum of harmonics

Mechanical/thermal problems, including vibration and hot spots

Transformer health index and expected loss of useful life

Permanent outage cannot be ruled out
Capacitor GIC-Blocking Schemes

Capacitor Neutral-Blocking Device

Alternative Capacitor Device
Resistor GIC-Reducing Concept

Resistor Mitigation Device
Surge Arrester GIC-Blocking Concept

Surge-Arrester Device
Arrester GIC-Blocking Concept

Typical Volt-Ampere characteristic of metal-oxide surge arresters

Comparative of transformer neutral voltage ranges
Probing Further, Technical Issues: Sensing and Deployment

GIC detection and switching of mitigation devices

Severe EMP, a DC current-interruption challenge

E1 pulse not a menace to major power apparatus

E1 pulse not a challenge from sensing standpoint
Proposed Sensor with Actionable Signal
Proposed Sensor with Actionable Signal
Questions?

Thank You

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